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The Medicare Act is not subject to the informal rulemaking requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Instead, it has its own provision that man-
dates notice and comment for proposed regulations. Courts have come to different 
conclusions regarding the scope of the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment require-
ment. This Comment interprets this Medicare Act provision to determine whether 
its requirement is equivalent in scope to that of the APA. This Comment presents 
arguments from text and legislative history to demonstrate that, as in the APA, 
interpretive rules are exempt from notice and comment. Finally, this Comment 
explains why this outcome is desirable as a policy matter: there is no reason to 
think that the ability to quickly promulgate interpretive rules is any less benefi-
cial in the context of Medicare than it is in those areas of administrative law 
governed by the APA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Administrative Procedure Act1 (APA) distinguishes be-
tween “legislative rules” that bind with the force of law and “in-
terpretive rules” that merely interpret existing statutes or rules.2 
Legislative rules must go through notice and public comment, but 
interpretive rules do not. Legislative rules are further subjected 
to so-called “hard look review,” under which courts hold rules with 
significant substantive or procedural shortcomings to be “arbi-
trary and capricious.”3 Interpretive rules, on the other hand, are 
usually challenged on the ground that they are not truly interpre-
tive rules but rather invalid legislative rules improperly promul-
gated without notice and comment.4 
Interpretive rules therefore represent a lower-cost alterna-
tive to legislative rules because they are procedurally easier to 
 
 1 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 2 The relevant statutory language uses the term “interpretative rules,” 5 USC 
§ 553(b)(1)(A), but the majority approach within administrative law scholarship is to refer 
to them as “interpretive rules.” “Legislative rules” is also a term of art in that body of 
scholarship. See generally, for example, Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, 
“Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 Admin L J Am U 1 (1994). 
 3 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
Duke L J 1385, 1411 (1992), citing Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v State Farm 
Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 43 (1983). 
 4 See, for example, American Mining Congress v Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, 995 F2d 1106, 1108–10 (DC Cir 1993). 
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produce and subject to less judicial scrutiny.5 The lower cost al-
lows agencies to efficiently and quickly issue authoritative inter-
pretations of existing law, freeing up agency resources for more 
resource-intensive tasks like legislative rulemaking. However, 
forgoing notice and comment involves a trade-off: agencies are 
able to promulgate rules more swiftly and efficiently, but regu-
lated parties may not have notice of the impending regulation and 
may be denied the opportunity to play a role in the rulemaking 
process.6 
Though the Medicare Act7 is not subject to the APA’s rule-
making section,8 it has, until recently, been understood to contain 
an interpretive rule exemption akin to that of the APA. The 
Medicare Act has its own section, 42 USC § 1395hh, that provides 
procedures for promulgating “regulations.” This section contains 
a notice-and-comment requirement, but courts disagree whether 
it applies to interpretive rules. Given the efficiency benefits of the 
interpretive rule exception and the countervailing risk of notice-
and-comment evasion, the resolution of this question has high 
stakes for agencies, regulated parties, and the public. 
The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all 
held that interpretive rules promulgated to carry out the 
Medicare Act are exempt from that statute’s notice-and-comment 
requirement.9 The DC Circuit recently broke with the other cir-
cuits in Allina Health Services v Price,10 holding that interpretive 
rules are not exempt from the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment 
requirement.11 Because any party challenging the validity of an 
interpretive rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) may do so in the DC 
Circuit,12 this decision has significant consequences for Medicare 
rulemaking. Even though there is technically a circuit split, the 
 
 5 David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the 
Short Cut, 120 Yale L J 276, 303–04 (2010). 
 6 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1441–42 (cited in note 3). 
 7 Social Security Amendments of 1965 (“Medicare Act”), Pub L No 89-97, 79 Stat 
286, codified at 42 USC § 1395 et seq. 
 8 See 5 USC § 553(a)(2) (exempting benefit programs). 
 9 See Warder v Shalala, 149 F3d 73, 79 n 4 (1st Cir 1998); Omni Manor Nursing Home 
v Thompson, 151 Fed Appx 427, 431 (6th Cir 2005); Baptist Health v Thompson, 458 F3d 
768, 776 n 9 (8th Cir 2006); Erringer v Thompson, 371 F3d 625, 633 (9th Cir 2004); Via 
Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc v Leavitt, 509 F3d 1259, 1271 n 11 (10th Cir 2007). 
 10 863 F3d 937 (DC Cir 2017). 
 11 Id at 942–45. 
 12 See 28 USC § 1391(e)(1). 
1514 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1511 
 
DC Circuit’s decision is likely to be the only one that truly mat-
ters—the Secretary can no longer promulgate many interpretive 
rules without going through notice and comment because the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia will 
strike these rules down under Allina Health Services.13 
The statutory interpretation conducted by the various courts 
of appeals has not led to a satisfactory resolution of the question. 
The First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all held 
without significant analysis that the Medicare Act created a dis-
tinction between legislative and interpretive rules akin to that of 
the APA, exempting interpretive rules from the notice-and-
comment requirement. These courts focused narrowly on individ-
ual provisions that appear to exempt interpretive rules by impli-
cation14 without considering the conspicuous absence of interpre-
tive rules from the list of express notice-and-comment 
exemptions.15 But the DC Circuit moved too far in the other direc-
tion, holding that the list of express exemptions precluded the ex-
istence of an interpretive-rule exception after only brief analysis 
of the provision’s scope. No court has thoroughly considered which 
agency actions constitute “regulations” subject to the notice-and-
comment requirement of § 1395hh. 
A more thorough analysis of § 1395hh suggests that interpre-
tive rules are not an exception to the notice-and-comment require-
ment of the statute but in fact fall entirely outside the scope of its 
notice-and-comment provision. The scope of that provision is lim-
ited to “regulations,” which are defined as agency actions that 
pertain to “substantive legal standard[s].”16 Because interpretive 
rules do not change substantive law, they do not affect “substan-
tive legal standards” in the normal sense of that term and are 
thus not “regulations” that must go through notice and comment. 
The structure of the statute, surrounding text, and relevant leg-
islative history strongly support this interpretation of the 
Medicare Act. 
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I describes infor-
mal rulemaking under the APA—focusing on the distinction be-
 
 13 The DC Circuit’s approach requires notice and comment only if a rule changes a 
substantive legal standard. Only some interpretive rules do this; others do not. See 
Part I.B. 
 14 See 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2), (c)(1). 
 15 See 42 USC § 1395hh(b). 
 16 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
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tween legislative and interpretive rules—and presents the rele-
vant procedural provisions and amendment history of the 
Medicare Act. It also discusses the consequences of procedural 
hurdles to rulemaking, giving salience to this question of statu-
tory interpretation. Part II presents courts’ interpretations of 
§ 1395hh, focusing on the split that has developed among the cir-
cuits. Part III critiques the existing approaches, engages in a 
thorough interpretation of the key statutory provisions, and con-
cludes that interpretive rules are not “regulations” subject to 
notice and comment under the scope provision, § 1395hh(a)(2). It 
also discusses why this outcome is desirable as a matter of policy. 
I.  BACKGROUND LAW: THE APA AND THE MEDICARE ACT 
Understanding the APA is crucial to interpreting the relevant 
provisions of the Medicare Act. Though the Medicare Act’s proce-
dural requirements differ from those of the APA, there is a great 
deal of similarity between the two statutes. Furthermore, the APA 
is the foundational law of federal administrative procedure. Even 
if a program is exempt from its rulemaking requirements, courts 
often view the parallel administrative procedure of the program 
through the lens of the APA.17 Consequently, Medicare rulemaking 
must be viewed in the broader context of the APA. 
A. Rulemaking under the APA: Notice and Comment 
The APA provides the procedural requirements for most in-
formal agency rulemaking. It defines “rules” broadly as “the 
whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, proce-
dure, or practice requirements of an agency.”18 
Informal rulemaking is the dominant method by which agen-
cies create regulatory law, and it has only a few statutory require-
ments.19 First, the agency must give notice of the proposed rule-
making by providing “(1) a statement of the time, place, and 
nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the 
 
 17 As Part II.A describes, courts have been all too ready to assume—without suffi-
cient analysis—that the Medicare Act operates in exactly the same way as the APA. 
 18 5 USC § 551(4). 
 19 Formal rulemaking involves “onerous trial-type hearings,” Franklin, 120 Yale L J 
at 282 (cited in note 5), “has become almost extinct,” Akhil Reed Amar and Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, 114 Harv L Rev 23, 374 n 44 (2000), and 
therefore lies beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either 
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved.”20 Second, the agency must provide 
interested parties the opportunity to submit comments on pro-
posed rules.21 Then, “[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter 
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a 
concise general statement of their basis and purpose.”22 Together, 
these provisions provide the “notice-and-comment” requirement 
for informal rulemaking. 
While the statutory requirements for informal rulemaking 
are superficially limited, courts have interpreted the APA broadly 
to require extensive release of information in a notice of proposed 
rulemaking and in-depth justification for rulemaking when re-
sponding to comments. The DC Circuit has held that “[i]t is not 
consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to prom-
ulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data, or on data that, [to 
a] critical degree, is known only to the agency.”23 Under the “hard 
look” doctrine, courts examine the rulemaking process (including, 
at least indirectly, the substance of the rule) to ensure that the 
agency has adequately explained the reasoning behind its action 
and responded to the material concerns of commenting parties.24 
Knowing that such review may await it after the rule is promul-
gated, an agency must invest significant resources in the notice-
and-comment process in order to generate a record that will allow 
the rule to survive judicial scrutiny.25 This further raises the costs 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
 
 20 5 USC § 553(b). 
 21 5 USC § 553(c). 
 22 5 USC § 553(c). 
 23 Portland Cement Association v Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375, 393 (DC Cir 1973). See 
also American Radio Relay League, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, 524 F3d 
227, 237 (DC Cir 2008) (“It would appear to be a fairly obvious proposition that studies 
upon which an agency relies in promulgating a rule must be made available during rule-
making in order to afford interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for 
comment.”). For a critique of this view, see id at 246 (Kavanaugh concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 24 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association of the United States, Inc v State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 43 (1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the 
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choices made.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 25 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1410–12 (cited in note 3). 
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B. Exceptions to Notice and Comment 
There are, however, a number of exceptions to the APA’s 
notice-and-comment requirement. Broad areas of subject matter 
are exempt, specifically military affairs, foreign affairs, matters 
of agency management or personnel, public property, loans, 
grants, contracts, and—of particular importance for the Medicare 
Act—benefits.26 
Furthermore, the APA provides an exception for interpretive 
rules and policy statements27 (collectively “nonlegislative 
rules”28). These rules, in contrast to legislative rules, lack the force 
of law and, at least in theory, simply clarify the law or provide 
guidance rather than legally bind the public or the agency.29 The 
line between “legislative” (or “substantive”) rules subject to the 
notice-and-comment requirement and interpretive rules exempt 
from the requirement is far from clear. The APA does not define 
the terms,30 and courts have had a great deal of difficulty articu-
lating a test to distinguish between the two.31 The dominant ap-
proach is currently the “legal effects” test, first articulated by the 
DC Circuit in American Mining Congress v Mine Safety and 
Health Administration:32 
[I]nsofar as our cases can be reconciled at all, we think it al-
most exclusively on the basis of whether the purported 
 
 26 5 USC § 553(a). 
 27 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A). 
 28 This term comes from courts and administrative law scholarship. It is not used in 
the APA. See generally, for example, John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 Geo Wash 
L Rev 893 (2004). 
 29 See id at 894. 
 30 It is worth noting that the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedure Act (United States Department of Justice, 1947) provides useful definitions 
roughly contemporaneous with the APA. It defines substantive rules as “rules, other than 
organizational or procedural . . . issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and 
which implement the statute. . . . Such rules have the force and effect of law.” Id at 30 n 3 
(emphasis added). It defines interpretive rules as “rules or statements issued by an agency 
to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it admin-
isters.” Id. The Supreme Court has given some deference to the Attorney General’s Manual 
because it was drafted contemporaneously with the APA and because the Department of 
Justice played a role in drafting the APA. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 435 US 519, 546 (1978). 
 31 See Richard J. Pierce Jr, Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative 
Rules, 52 Admin L Rev 547, 547–48 (2000) (“Courts often refer to the distinction between 
the two types of rules as ‘fuzzy,’ ‘tenuous,’ ‘blurred,’ ‘baffling,’ and ‘enshrouded in consid-
erable smog.’”) (citations omitted). 
 32 995 F2d 1106 (DC Cir 1993). 
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interpretive rule has “legal effect,” which in turn is best as-
certained by asking (1) whether in the absence of the rule 
there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforce-
ment action or other agency action to confer benefits or en-
sure the performance of duties, (2) whether the agency has 
published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
(3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general leg-
islative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively amends 
a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any of these questions 
is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive 
rule.33 
But these are just a few of the many factors that courts have 
looked to in answering the more general question of “whether a 
nominal ‘interpretive rule,’ in fact, merely interprets a statute or 
legislative regulation rather than makes new law.”34 All agency 
rules involve policymaking to some extent because any resolution 
of ambiguity requires policy judgment, and if the statute were not 
ambiguous, no interpretive rule would be necessary.35 Neverthe-
less, it is generally understood under the legal effects test that, 
even if an interpretive rule guides agency action to some extent 
through its interpretation of the underlying law, it is the under-
lying statute or legislative rule that provides the legal basis for 
agency action. 
The APA also contains a “good cause” exception. If an agency 
finds that “notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,” the agency may 
forgo notice and comment on the condition that the agency explain 
in the rule why it is invoking the exception.36 Common forms of 
rulemaking under the good cause exception include interim final 
 
 33 Id at 1112. 
 34 Manning, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 920 (cited in note 28). 
 35 Id at 894. American Mining Congress is illustrative. In that case, the DC Circuit held 
that an agency rule stating that certain x-ray results constitute a positive “diagnosis” for 
purposes of another agency rule was indeed interpretive. 995 F2d at 1108–13. While it is 
perfectly reasonable to say that a given numerical test result constitutes a diagnosis, it is not 
purely interpretive. “Diagnosis” could easily mean a diagnosis from a doctor, for example. 
And it is not clear that the x-ray cutoff settled upon by the agency is the only one that they 
could have chosen consistent with the statutory language. If there are multiple interpreta-
tions of a rule, all of which are more or less equally plausible, then choosing among the var-
ious possible interpretations constitutes policymaking. The result of the inquiry is not dic-
tated by the text of the original legislative rule or other source of legal meaning, so the agency 
is doing more than simply determining the best meaning of a term; rather, it is actively cre-
ating policy. See Manning, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 920 (cited in note 28). 
 36 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(B). 
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rulemaking, in which an agency issues a final rule before consider-
ing comments, and direct final rulemaking, in which an agency an-
nounces a rule that will go into effect if no one objects to it.37 
C. Ossification and the Significance of Nonlegislative 
Rulemaking 
The burdensome notice-and-comment requirement and hard-
look review have generated a significant literature decrying the 
“ossification” of informal rulemaking.38 The ossification hypothe-
sis posits that these procedural burdens have increased the costs 
of creating or changing regulations. In the face of such increased 
costs, agencies will necessarily regulate less.39 If one accepts the 
premise that agencies enact regulatory policies to increase social 
welfare (and are at least sometimes successful in doing so), then 
ossification is a problem to the extent that it drives rulemaking 
below the welfare-maximizing level.40 While even proponents of 
the ossification theory acknowledge that there are likely trade-
offs between administrative efficiency and the various benefits 
 
 37 See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 Admin L Rev 
703, 704–06 & n 12 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: 
Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 Admin L Rev 757, 763 (1999). 
 38 See generally, for example, William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve 
Regulatory Goals through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw U L Rev 393 (2000); Richard J. 
Pierce Jr, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin L Rev 59 (1995); 
McGarity, 41 Duke L J 1385 (cited in note 3). 
 39 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1388–91 (cited in note 3). 
 40 See id at 1391: 
Since most regulatory statutes were enacted to accomplish progressive public 
policy goals, the ossification of the informal rulemaking process hinders or de-
feats the agency’s pursuit of those goals. To some extent, the fact that the air 
and waters of the United States are still polluted, workplaces still dangerous, 
motor vehicles still unsafe, and consumers still being deceived is attributable to 
the expense and burdensomeness of the informal rulemaking process. 
But see generally Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification 
Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 
80 Geo Wash L Rev 1414 (2012) (using Department of the Interior rulemaking data to 
challenge the ossification hypothesis). For a description of the potential benefits of ossifi-
cation, see generally Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U Chi L Rev 85 (2018). It is 
worth noting, however, that Professor Aaron Nielson’s critique does not necessarily apply 
to interpretive rules. His primary argument is that ossification provides a valuable way 
for agencies to credibly commit to regulatory programs. Id at 116. If most interpretive 
rules are minor clarifications of law or agency policy unlikely to significantly affect the 
behavior of regulated parties, ossification is of limited value. This, of course, depends on 
the extent to which interpretive rules are surreptitiously crafting policy. 
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that come from more deliberative rulemaking procedures,41 this 
does not render the ossification issue irrelevant. Rather, it points 
to the importance of determining the relative magnitudes of the 
costs and benefits of heightened procedural requirements and ju-
dicial review. 
Interpretive rules—and nonlegislative rules more gener-
ally—have played a role in the ossification debate. Scholars have 
hypothesized that agencies promulgate interpretive rules instead 
of legislative rules in order to avoid the burdensome requirements 
of notice and comment, thereby lowering the costs of rulemaking 
and speeding up the rulemaking process.42 Indeed, critics of ossi-
fication have expressed concern that increasing the costs of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking has produced a nefarious substi-
tution effect, driving agencies toward less formal policymaking 
mechanisms, such as interpretive rulemaking, that provide par-
ties with less notice and opportunity for input.43 This is problem-
atic because the increased flexibility of these forms of rulemaking 
comes at the price of accountability and participation by inter-
ested parties.44 Under this theory, widespread use (or abuse) of 
interpretive rules is symptomatic of ossification and does not rep-
resent a solution to its core problem. 
D. The Medicare Act and Its Procedural Rulemaking Provision  
The Medicare Act (passed as the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965) was enacted to provide insurance programs 
for the elderly and disabled. As amended, it contains four main 
parts: Part A, which provides hospital benefits; Part B, which pro-
vides medical insurance; Part C, which permits private insurance 
companies to administer Medicare benefits; and Part D, which 
provides prescription drug benefits.45 Today, Medicare is a mas-
sive public benefits program—over fifty-seven million Americans 
 
 41 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1391–92 (cited in note 3) (“To be sure, other societal 
goals, such as fairness, allocative efficiency, and factual accuracy, may demand more de-
liberative rulemaking procedures.”). See also Franklin, 120 Yale L J at 303–05 (cited in 
note 5) (describing the costs and benefits of nonlegislative rulemaking). 
 42 See, for example, McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1441–43 (cited in note 3). 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. One can imagine regimes in between interpretive rulemaking and notice-
and-comment rulemaking. For example, agencies could be required to give notice and 
solicit input from the public but not be subjected to hard-look review. 
 45 See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Administrative Law of the Medicare 
Program, 15 Yale J Health Pol L & Ethics 111, 113 (2015). 
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receive benefits under Parts A and B46—and “is governed by a 
complex web of legislative rules, interpretive rules and manuals, 
[and] policy guidance.”47 
1. Overview of the Medicare Act’s key rulemaking 
provisions. 
Medicare is not subject to the APA’s informal rulemaking re-
quirements because it is a benefits program.48 The original 
Medicare Act imposed no independent procedural requirements 
for Medicare rulemaking.49 But in the intervening years, 
Congress has amended the statute numerous times to include 
provisions prescribing procedures for rulemaking under the Act.50 
The Medicare Act, as amended, now contains a number of im-
portant procedural rulemaking provisions codified at 42 USC 
§ 1395hh. Subsection (a)(1)—the “power-to-regulate provision”—
authorizes the HHS Secretary to promulgate regulations to carry 
out the Medicare statute.51 But such regulations are further sub-
ject to subsection (a)(2)—the “scope provision”—which provides 
that 
[n]o rule, requirement, or other statement of policy . . . that 
establishes or changes a substantive legal standard govern-
ing the scope of benefits, the payment for services, or the eli-
gibility of individuals, entities, or organizations [to receive 
benefits] . . . under this title shall take effect unless it is prom-
ulgated by the Secretary by regulation under paragraph (1).52 
Pursuant to § 1395hh(b)(1)—the “notice-and-comment provi-
sion”—the Secretary is required to “provide for notice of the pro-
posed regulation in the Federal Register and a period of not less 
 
 46 US Department of Health and Human Services, 2016 CMS Statistics *2 (Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9VXW-R9VS. 
 47 See Kinney, 15 Yale J Health Pol L & Ethics at 111 (cited in note 45). 
 48 See 5 USC § 553(a)(2). 
 49 See Medicare Act § 1871, 79 Stat at 331 (granting the HHS Secretary statutory 
authority to prescribe regulations but imposing no procedural requirements). 
 50 See 42 USC § 1395hh. 
 51 See 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this 
title. When used in this title, the term ‘regulations’ means, unless the context otherwise 
requires, regulations prescribed by the Secretary.”). 
 52 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
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than 60 days for public comment thereon.”53 That provision pro-
vides several exceptions to the notice-and-comment requirement, 
most importantly by explicitly incorporating the good cause ex-
ception of the APA.54 But subsection (c)(1)—the “alternative pub-
lication provision”—provides an alternative route for the publica-
tion of interpretive rules, among other nonlegislative rules: 
The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register, not less 
frequently than every 3 months, a list of all manual instruc-
tions, interpretative rules, statements of policy, and guide-
lines of general applicability which—(A) are promulgated to 
carry out this title, but (B) are not published pursuant to sub-
section (a)(1) and have not been previously published in a list 
under this subsection.55 
2. The amendment history of § 1395hh. 
To understand the significance of and interaction between 
the various provisions of § 1395hh, it is helpful to consider the 
sequence of amendments that added these key provisions to the 
statute. As noted above, the original Medicare Act was exempt 
from the APA and contained no independent procedural rulemak-
ing requirements,56 and § 1395hh initially consisted entirely of 
what is now the power-to-regulate provision.57 In 1971, however, 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—now 
the HHS—issued a statement of policy directing agencies within 
the Department to “utilize the public participation procedures of 
the APA.”58 Informal rulemaking under Medicare was carried out 
under this voluntary arrangement for about fifteen years, at 
which point Congress stepped in. 
In 1986, Congress amended § 1395hh, codifying notice-and-
comment procedures.59 The amendment explicitly incorporated 
 
 53 42 USC § 1395hh(b)(1). This provision requires a longer comment period than that 
required by the APA. 
 54 See 42 USC § 1395hh(b)(2). 
 55 42 USC § 1395hh(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 56 See notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 57 See note 51 and accompanying text. 
 58 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Participation in Rule 
Making, 36 Fed Reg 2532, 2532 (1971), citing 5 USC § 553. 
 59 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9321, Pub L No 99-509, 100 Stat 
1874, codified at 42 USC § 1395hh(b). 
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the APA’s good cause exception and provided a few additional ex-
ceptions irrelevant to nonlegislative rulemaking.60 In 1987, 
Congress once again amended § 1395hh, this time adding two pro-
visions: the scope provision and the alternative publication provi-
sion.61 This suggests that the scope provision was added specifi-
cally to clarify which agency actions are “regulations” subject to 
the notice-and-comment requirement created by the 1986 
amendment.62 
II.  COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEDICARE ACT’S 
RULEMAKING PROVISIONS  
A circuit split has recently arisen over whether the Medicare 
Act contains an interpretive rule exception akin to that of the 
APA. Before 2017, each court of appeals that had considered the 
question held that the Medicare Act included such an exception.63 
But in Allina Health Services, the DC Circuit broke with the other 
circuits by holding that interpretive rules promulgated under the 
Medicare Act must go through notice and comment if they fall 
within the scope provision.64 This decision is significant because 
any party challenging the validity of an interpretive Medicare 
rule can file a lawsuit in the DC Circuit65 and, given the choice of 
venue, will presumably choose the one with the more favorable 
precedent. Therefore, most litigation in this area will likely go 
through the DC Circuit and be subject to the rule from Allina 
Health Services. 
A. The Majority Approach: Interpretive Rules Implementing 
Medicare Are Exempt from the Act’s Notice-and-Comment 
Requirement 
Courts that have found an interpretive rule exception in the 
Medicare Act have done so through two distinct interpretations 
 
 60 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, § 9321(e), 100 Stat at 1874, 
2017–18. 
 61 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 4035, Pub L No 100-203, 101 Stat 
1330, 1330–77, codified at 42 USC § 1395hh(a), (c)(1). 
 62 The repeated amendments to the statute also provide a possible explanation for 
the inconsistencies among courts’ interpretations of its provisions. The patchwork of stat-
utory provisions does not fit together perfectly—or even very well—leaving the whole of 
§ 13955hh ambiguous and open to a range of interpretations. 
 63 See note 9. The DC Circuit also endorsed this view in dicta. See Monmouth Medical 
Center v Thompson, 257 F3d 807, 814 (DC Cir 2001). 
 64 See Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 942–45. 
 65 See 28 USC § 1391(e)(1). 
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of the statute. In one case, Warder v Shalala,66 the First Circuit 
held that the alternative publication provision independently cre-
ated an interpretive rule exception.67 In another line of cases led 
by Erringer v Thompson,68 courts have held that the scope provi-
sion exempts interpretive rules from the notice-and-comment re-
quirement.69 Even though these two approaches lead to the same 
outcome, they engage in dramatically different—and possibly in-
compatible—constructions of the statute. 
The Warder court focused its analysis on the alternative pub-
lication provision. In evaluating the validity of a Health Care 
Financing Administration rule that classified a piece of medical 
equipment in a way that limited Medicare reimbursement,70 the 
First Circuit held that “[t]he Medicare Act expressly incorporates 
the APA’s exemption for interpretive rules.”71 The court inferred 
from Congress’s prescription of an alternative publication process 
that the types of rules mentioned in that provision72 were exempt 
from the notice-and-comment requirement set forth in the stat-
ute.73 While the court noted that “the Medicare statute . . . phrases 
the distinction between substantive and interpretive rules 
slightly differently from the APA,” it nevertheless held that the 
Medicare Act’s “language, drafted after the APA’s, can fairly be 
read to duplicate the APA on this score.”74 The court pointed to 
the scope provision as requiring notice and comment for rules that 
change a “substantive legal standard” but did not resolve the 
meaning of that provision. Rather, it held that the statute ex-
empted interpretive rules by providing an alternative mode of pub-
lication for interpretive rules not promulgated as regulations.75 
In Erringer, the Ninth Circuit identified the scope provision 
as the source of the interpretive rule exception.76 The interpretive 
 
 66 149 F3d 73 (1st Cir 1998). 
 67 See id at 79. 
 68 371 F3d 625 (9th Cir 2004). 
 69 See id at 633. 
 70 Warder, 149 F3d at 75. 
 71 Id at 79. 
 72 The statute requires notice and comment under 42 USC § 1395hh(b) and mandates 
quarterly publication of “all manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of pol-
icy, and guidelines of general applicability which . . . have not been previously published 
in a list under this subsection” under 42 USC § 1395hh(c). 
 73 Warder, 149 F3d at 79 n 4. 
 74 Id. It is not entirely clear how the court arrived at its conclusion that the Medicare 
Act reproduced the requirements of the APA. 
 75 See id. 
 76 Erringer, 371 F3d at 633. 
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rule in that case mandated the use of specific criteria in issuing 
coverage determinations affecting the claims of Medicare contrac-
tors.77 In evaluating whether the statute exempted interpretive 
rules from notice and comment, the Ninth Circuit emphasized 
that the heading of the scope provision explicitly states that the 
provision governs substantive rules.78 It inferred from that head-
ing and the text of the provision that the Medicare Act drew a 
distinction between “substantive rules” subject to notice and com-
ment and “interpretive rules” exempt from such requirements.79 
It acknowledged the possibility that the Medicare Act might 
“somehow draw[ ] the line between substantive and interpretive 
rules in a different place than the APA.”80 But the court “found no 
reason to explore the possibility of a distinction between the 
Medicare Act and the APA because the rule in question . . . was 
not close to the interpretive/substantive line.”81 
The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits largely followed the 
reasoning of Erringer. In Baptist Health v Thompson,82 the Eighth 
Circuit noted simply that § 1395hh “imposes no standards greater 
than those established by the APA” and went on to apply the 
APA’s familiar interpretive/legislative framework.83 In Via 
Christi Regional Medical Center, Inc v Leavitt,84 the Tenth Circuit 
stated that, while “[t]he Medicare statute contains some addi-
tional language regarding the promulgation and effect of rules 
and policy statements, . . . courts generally interpret it to impose 
‘no standards greater than those established by the APA.’”85 And 
in Omni Manor Nursing Home v Thompson,86 the Sixth Circuit im-
plicitly endorsed the majority approach by simply presenting the 
text of § 1395hh(a)(2) and applying the substantive/interpretive 
rule framework commonly employed by courts applying the APA.87 
  
 
 77 Id at 627–28. 
 78 Id at 633. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Erringer, 371 F3d at 633. 
 81 Id, citing Monmouth Medical Center, 257 F3d at 814. 
 82 458 F3d 768 (8th Cir 2006). 
 83 Id at 776 n 9, citing Erringer, 371 F3d at 633. 
 84 509 F3d 1259 (10th Cir 2007). 
 85 Id at 1271 n 11, quoting Baptist Health, 458 F3d at 776 n 8. 
 86 151 Fed Appx 427 (6th Cir 2005). 
 87 Id at 431. 
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B. The DC Circuit Approach: Interpretive Rules Are Not 
Exempt from the Medicare Act’s Notice-and-Comment 
Requirement  
In Allina Health Services, the DC Circuit held that the 
Medicare Act does not incorporate the APA’s interpretive rule ex-
ception.88 The court relied on a narrow interpretation of the scope 
provision and an expressio unius argument,89 looking to the ex-
plicit exceptions of the notice-and-comment provision.90 Like the 
Erringer court, the DC Circuit used the scope provision to deter-
mine which agency actions are subject to the Medicare Act’s 
notice-and-comment requirement.91 The court interpreted the 
term “substantive” in the substantive/procedural sense and, look-
ing to a dictionary to define “substantive law,” concluded that a 
“‘substantive legal standard’ at a minimum includes a standard 
that ‘creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers 
of parties.’”92 The court concluded that the interpretive rule—
which instituted a new formula for calculating reimbursements 
to hospitals treating low-income Medicare patients—created such 
a standard and that notice and comment was required by the 
scope provision.93 
 
 88 863 F3d at 944. The court also resolved the case on alternative grounds, holding 
that, even if the Medicare Act incorporated the APA’s interpretive rule exception, notice 
and comment would still be required by § 1395hh(a)(4). Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 
945. This section stipulates that “a final regulation that includes a provision that is not a 
logical outgrowth of a previously published notice of proposed rulemaking or interim final 
rule . . . shall be treated as a proposed regulation” and subject to further comment before 
it takes effect. 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(4). 
 89 The expressio unius canon of statutory interpretation, also known as the negative-
implication canon, suggests that, when specific members of a class are mentioned, other 
members of the class are excluded by implication. See Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (West 2012). 
 90 See Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 944. 
 91 Id at 943 (“[T]he Medicare Act requires notice-and-comment rulemaking for any 
(1) ‘rule, requirement, or other statement of policy’ that (2) ‘establishes or changes’ (3) a 
‘substantive legal standard’ that (4) governs ‘payment for services.’”), quoting 42 USC 
§ 1395hh(a)(2). 
 92 Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 943, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (West 
10th ed 2014). 
 93 The position taken in Allina Health Services is somewhat surprising given that 
the DC Circuit had previously adopted the majority position in dicta. See Monmouth 
Medical Center, 257 F3d at 814. The court noted in that case that the alternative publica-
tion provision seemed to create an interpretive rule exception at least similar in scope to 
that of the APA but did not explicitly hold that the Medicare statute incorporated the 
interpretive-rule exception. Id. Interestingly, the DC Circuit—like the Warder court—
found the interpretive rule exception in the alternative publication provision rather than 
in the scope provision, indicating that it thought that the presence of an alternative pub-
lishing method for interpretive rules was particularly compelling evidence. Id. As 
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The court then reasoned that § 1395hh(b)(2), which does not 
include an interpretive rule exception, constitutes an exhaustive 
list of exceptions to the notice-and-comment requirement.94 
Therefore, the statute does not contain an exception for interpre-
tive rules.95 This argument is strengthened by the fact that the 
statute explicitly incorporates by reference the APA’s good cause 
exception.96 
III.  THE MEDICARE ACT’S NOTICE-AND-COMMENT REQUIREMENT 
DOES NOT APPLY TO INTERPRETIVE RULES 
The existing case law provides incomplete interpretations of 
the statute. Courts have adopted three distinct interpretations of 
§ 1395hh, each presenting a reasonable interpretation of an indi-
vidual provision of the statute.97 But the courts have not situated 
their readings of those provisions in the context of the statute as 
a whole. 
A more holistic construction of the statute can help resolve 
its serious ambiguities. Under the scope provision, agency actions 
that pertain to “substantive legal standard[s]” are “regulations” 
that must go through notice and comment.98 In isolation, it is not 
clear how the term “substantive legal standard” should be under-
stood. But the nature of interpretive rules, the title of the scope 
provision, the distinction between “regulations” and “interpretive 
rules” presented elsewhere in the statute,99 and legislative history 
strongly suggest that such standards can be created only by leg-
islative rules. 
 
Part III.B.3 discusses, the alternative publication provision is not particularly helpful in 
interpreting the statute. However, the Monmouth Medical Center court held that the reg-
ulation was a legislative rule under the APA, so the existence of an interpretive rule ex-
ception was irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Id at 814. The conclusion regarding 
§ 1395hh is therefore dicta and, moreover, was explicitly rejected by the DC Circuit in 
Allina Health Services. 
 94 Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 944. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id (“Moreover, Congress knew how to incorporate the APA’s notice-and-comment 
exceptions into the Medicare Act when it wanted to. After all, the Medicare Act expressly 
incorporates other APA notice-and-comment exceptions. Specifically, the Medicare Act in-
corporates the APA’s ‘good cause’ exception.”). 
 97 Section 1395hh(a)(2) in Erringer, § 1395hh(c)(1) in Warder, and § 1395hh(b) in 
Allina Health Services. 
 98 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 99 See 42 USC § 1395hh(e)(1). 
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This Part proceeds in four sections. Part III.A evaluates ex-
isting court interpretations of the Medicare Act. Part III.B en-
gages in a thorough interpretation of § 1395hh, focusing on likely 
meanings of the key term in isolation, whole-act construction, and 
legislative history. It concludes that interpretive rules are not 
“regulations” subject to the Act’s notice-and-comment require-
ment. Part III.C explains why this interpretation of the statute 
undercuts the expressio unius argument presented in Allina 
Health Services. Finally, Part III.D argues that the interpretive 
rule exception is desirable as a matter of policy. 
A. Evaluation of the Existing Court Approaches  
None of the existing approaches provides a complete account 
of the Medicare Act’s rulemaking provision. In Warder, the First 
Circuit did not consider the scope provision and held with only 
brief justification that the alternative method of publication “ex-
empt[ed] by implication” interpretive rules.100 This seems unlikely 
because there is inherent tension in arguing that, although there 
is an express list of exemptions, a major implicit exemption nev-
ertheless exists.101 The scope argument—that interpretive rules 
are not subject to promulgation by regulation under the scope pro-
vision and therefore not subject to notice and comment—devel-
oped by later courts better supports the proposition that interpre-
tive rules need not go through notice and comment. 
In Erringer, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the text of the 
scope provision requires legislative rules to be promulgated as 
“regulations” subject to notice and comment.102 But the court did 
not justify its interpretation of the provision beyond drawing at-
tention to its title: “Authority to prescribe regulations; ineffective-
ness of substantive rules not promulgated by regulation.”103 And 
the court did not determine whether interpretive rules can create 
a “substantive legal standard.” The statute is complicated and 
contains numerous provisions that inform the scope of the notice-
and-comment requirement.104 Though the conclusion of Erringer 
is correct, the court did not present enough evidence beyond the 
 
 100 Warder, 149 F3d at 79 n 4. 
 101 This is basically the expressio unius argument made in Allina Health Services, 863 
F3d at 944–45. 
 102 Erringer, 371 F3d at 633. 
 103 Id, quoting 42 USC § 1395hh(a) (quotation marks omitted). 
 104 See Part III.B. 
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title of the provision to support its interpretation. The circuits fol-
lowing Erringer were largely conclusory in their analyses.105 
Allina Health Services more fully engaged with the text of the 
statute. The DC Circuit described and to some extent supported 
its interpretation of the phrase “substantive legal standard.”106 
But like the Ninth Circuit in Erringer, the DC Circuit did not con-
template other reasonable interpretations of the text or square its 
interpretation of the provision with other parts of the statute that 
suggested its interpretation might be incorrect.107 The court 
simply concluded from the text of the scope provision that some 
interpretive rules are subject to notice and comment. The court 
did not consider compelling evidence that the scope provision may 
specifically govern legislative rules and ignored contextual evi-
dence from § 1395hh(e)(1) that the class of “regulations” subject 
to notice and comment does not include interpretive rules. Most 
importantly, the court did not define the key statutory term “reg-
ulation,” which determines how the scope provision dictates the 
breadth of the notice-and-comment provision. 
B. A Complete Interpretation of § 1395hh 
A more rigorous interpretation of the statute could resolve 
the circuit split. One particularly important point that has not 
been sufficiently addressed in the court opinions interpreting 
§ 1395hh is the ambiguity of the scope provision. Each court has 
equated the scope of Medicare’s notice-and-comment requirement 
to that of the APA and focused its analysis on the presence (or 
lack thereof) of an exception for interpretive rules. Some courts 
have determined that the scope provision or the alternative pub-
lication provision exempts interpretive rules from notice and com-
ment, but none has fully examined whether interpretive rules fall 
within the scope provision. In other words, no court has deter-
mined whether the “regulations” governed by the notice-and-
comment provision of the Medicare Act are equivalent to what the 
APA considers “rules.”108 This Comment argues below that the 
 
 105 See, for example, Baptist Health, 458 F3d at 776 n 9 (presenting the text of 
§ 1395hh(a)(2) and stating simply that “this provision imposes no standards greater than 
those established by the APA”). 
 106 See Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 943. 
 107 See id at 943–45. 
 108 In Warder, the First Circuit came close to considering this issue and distinguish-
ing rules from regulations when it noted that § 1395hh(c) “requir[es] periodic publication 
of ‘interpretive rules’ that have not been issued as regulations.” 149 F3d at 79 n 4. 
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two classes are distinct and that the Medicare Act’s notice-and-
comment provision109 is fundamentally different in scope from 
that of the APA. While the APA applies generally to “rules,” 
creating an exemption for interpretive rules, the Medicare Act ap-
plies to “regulations,” defining that term to exclude interpretive 
rules. An express exception is therefore unnecessary. 
This Section proceeds in five steps. First, it explains why the 
phrase “substantive legal standard” is the key phrase in the scope 
provision, and it explores several meanings that the phrase may 
have. Second, it analyzes the rest of the scope provision and con-
cludes that the provision does not help resolve the question. 
Third, it looks to the other provisions of § 1395hh to provide con-
text for interpreting the scope provision. This context supports a 
narrower reading of the scope provision. Fourth, it looks to the 
title of the scope provision, which suggests that the rules de-
scribed in the scope provision are “substantive” rules. Last, it con-
siders the relevant legislative history, which suggests that the 
language in the scope provision was chosen by Congress to reflect 
the test used by courts in distinguishing between legislative and 
interpretive rules. While the text of the scope provision may be 
ambiguous, the title, context, and legislative history provide com-
pelling evidence that Congress intended only legislative rules to 
be subject to the notice-and-comment requirement. 
1. The scope provision specifies which agency actions 
constitute “regulations” subject to notice and comment. 
The status of interpretive rules in § 1395hh is established by 
the text of the scope provision.110 The notice-and-comment provi-
sion takes as its object “any regulation under subsection (a),”111 so 
the requirement is best understood to apply specifically to agency 
actions described as regulations in subsection (a).112 And the scope 
 
 109 42 USC § 1395hh(b). 
 110 Both Erringer, 471 F3d at 633, and Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 943, treated 
this provision as establishing the scope of the notice-and-comment requirement even if 
they disagreed on its meaning. 
 111 42 USC § 1395hh(b)(1). 
 112 It is worth noting that, even if the term “regulation” were not explicitly defined 
within the statute, it could bear two meanings, one including only legislative (substantive) 
rules and the other including all agency rules. The edition of Black’s Law Dictionary con-
temporaneous with the key 1986 and 1987 amendments to the Medicare Act defines a 
“regulation” as a “rule or order having force of law issued by executive authority of gov-
ernment” and notes that “United States Government regulations appear first in the 
Federal Register . . . and are subsequently arranged by subject in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156–57 (West 5th ed 1979). See also Manning, 72 
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provision is the component of subsection (a)—and within the stat-
ute as a whole—that most directly defines “regulations” for pur-
poses of the statute. It states that a certain set of agency policies 
“shall [not] take effect unless . . . promulgated by the Secretary 
by regulation under paragraph (1).”113 The provision refers to “reg-
ulation” as a process that certain agency actions must go through 
in order to “take effect.”114 Those actions that must be promul-
gated through the process of “regulation” are best understood as 
being coextensive with the “regulations” contemplated through-
out § 1395hh, including the notice-and-comment provision. 
The issue is whether interpretive rules fall within the scope 
provision and are thereby subject to notice and comment. The 
scope provision reads in full: 
No rule, requirement, or other statement of policy (other than 
a national coverage determination) that establishes or 
changes a substantive legal standard governing the scope of 
benefits, the payment for services, or the eligibility of indi-
viduals, entities, or organizations to furnish or receive ser-
vices or benefits under this subchapter shall take effect un-
less it is promulgated by the Secretary by regulation under 
paragraph (1).115 
As the DC Circuit correctly noted in Allina Health Services, 
the key phrase in the provision is “substantive legal standard.”116 
The DC Circuit looked to a dictionary to define the phrase as fol-
lows: “A ‘substantive legal standard’ at a minimum includes a 
standard that ‘creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, 
and powers of parties.’”117 From this definition, it concluded that 
the interpretive rule at issue in the case changed the duties of the 
parties by defining a term used to calculate Medicare payments.118 
This is a good place to start the analysis, but it is far from 
clear that an interpretive rule can have such an effect. After all, 
the dominant approach taken by courts in distinguishing between 
 
Geo Wash L Rev at 930–31 (cited in note 28) (“[L]egislative rules have the distinctive ca-
pacity to bind with the force of statutes.”). However, that same dictionary also defines a 
“regulation” as a “[r]ule of order prescribed by superior or competent authority relating to 
an action of those under its control.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156–57 (West 5th ed 1979). 
 113 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 114 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 115 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 116 Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 943. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
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legislative and interpretive rules has been to ask whether they 
bind with the “force of law” or have “legal effects.” Legislative 
rules act with the force of law, but interpretive rules do not.119 And 
an interpretive rule does not impose legal obligations on its own; 
rather, its “force derives from the existing legal duty inherent in 
the existing legislative rule or statute.”120 To determine whether 
a rule is legislative, courts traditionally look to “whether in the 
absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative 
basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer ben-
efits or ensure the performance of duties.”121 The interpretive rule 
in Allina Health Services, for example, does not independently 
create or modify a legal duty or change a legal standard. The legal 
duty is created by the Medicare Act, which requires that patients 
“entitled to benefits under Part A” be included in the Medicare 
fraction for calculating hospital reimbursement.122 The agency’s 
interpretive rule merely clarifies or describes an existing legal 
duty created by statute.123 
The phrase “substantive legal standard” is best understood 
as codifying the legal effects test in the Medicare Act. Only a rule 
that creates or modifies the legal obligations of parties can be said 
to “establish or change a substantive legal standard.” Such a rule 
is a legislative rule. Therefore, interpretive rules fall outside of 
the scope provision and are not “regulations” subject to the notice-
and-comment requirement. 
One way to argue for a broader meaning of the term—one 
that does encompass some interpretive rules—would be to focus 
 
 119 See National Latino Media Coalition v Federal Communications Commission, 816 
F2d 785, 788 (DC Cir 1987) (“An ‘interpretative’ rule, by contrast [to a legislative rule], does 
not contain new substance of its own but merely expresses the agency’s understanding of a 
congressional statute. . . . Thus an interpretative rule does not have the force of law.”). See 
also National Mining Association v McCarthy, 758 F3d 243, 251–52 (DC Cir 2014): 
An agency action that sets forth legally binding requirements for a private party 
to obtain a permit or license is a legislative rule. (As to interpretive rules, an 
agency action that merely interprets a prior statute or regulation, and does not 
itself purport to impose new obligations or prohibitions or requirements on reg-
ulated parties, is an interpretive rule.) 
 120 Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U Chi L Rev 1705, 1711 n 42 
(2007) (emphasis added), citing General Motors v Ruckelshaus, 742 F2d 1561, 1565 (DC 
Cir 1984). See also National Latino Media Coalition, 816 F2d at 788. 
 121 American Mining Congress, 995 F2d at 1112. 
 122 Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 939, quoting 42 USC § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I). 
The Medicare fraction is a component of the formula used to calculate reimbursements 
made to “hospitals that treat a disproportionately high number of low-income patients.” 
Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 938. 
 123 See notes 27–35 and accompanying text. 
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on the word “standard” in “substantive legal standard.” Interpre-
tive rules can certainly articulate standards by which regulated 
parties’ conduct will be evaluated. And while such rules may not 
constitute “substantive law” in any strict sense of the term, it has 
been argued that interpretive rules are functionally similar to 
substantive law when they are used to bind parties.124 So if “sub-
stantive legal standard” is given its broadest possible meaning, it 
could conceivably encompass some interpretive rules, namely, 
those interpretive rules that put forward binding standards 
drawn from statutes or legislative rules. 
But such a broad meaning does not seem likely given courts’ 
formalistic understanding of what constitutes substantive law for 
purposes of administrative procedure. While the Medicare Act is 
not subject to the APA’s rulemaking requirement, it still uses 
much of the language associated with the APA’s distinction be-
tween substantive and interpretive rules. Given that the APA de-
fines terms that are widely used in administrative law, it makes 
sense to start with the assumption that those terms are being 
used similarly in other statutes pertaining to administrative pro-
cedure. Absent compelling evidence to the contrary, “substantive 
legal standard” should be read narrowly to exclude interpretive 
rules from the definition of “regulation” presented in the scope 
provision and therefore from the notice-and-comment require-
ment. Nevertheless, it is necessary to look to the statute as a 
whole and to legislative history to determine the meaning of the 
scope provision. 
2. The rest of the text of the scope provision does not clarify 
its meaning. 
One possible argument in favor of the broad construction of 
the scope provision can be drawn from its inclusion of “require-
ment[s]” and “other statement[s] of policy” in addition to “rule[s].” 
This language could suggest that agency actions beyond “rules” 
must be promulgated as regulations subject to the notice-and-
 
 124 See Gersen, 74 U Chi L Rev at 1711 (cited in note 120) (citation omitted): 
But at least one pocket of scholarship suggests that . . . valid interpretive rules 
are binding to the extent that they “merely interpret” already existing legal du-
ties. 
 
Rules that should have been issued using notice and comment procedures but 
were not are known as spurious rules or, equivalently, procedurally-deficient 
legislative rules. 
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comment requirement. It is a widely accepted principle of statu-
tory interpretation that all words of a statute should be given ef-
fect when possible.125 One could argue that the terms “require-
ment” and “other statement of policy” would be superfluous if they 
did not expand the scope of the provision beyond legislative rules 
and subject some other agency actions to promulgation through 
notice and comment. 
There is an alternative explanation, however, that is con-
sistent with the narrower interpretation of the scope provision. 
This language could also be read as simply clarifying that all 
agency actions, regardless of their designations by agencies, will 
be subject to notice and comment if they change substantive legal 
standards. The reference to “other statement[s] of policy” could 
simply mean that any agency action, even if it is nominally a 
statement of policy, must be promulgated “by regulation” and 
through notice and comment if it establishes or changes a “sub-
stantive legal standard”126—that is, if it is in fact a legislative rule 
incorrectly presented by the agency. In this way, the expansive 
language at the beginning of the provision could simply be ex-
pressing the familiar idea that the content of the agency action 
and not its formal designation is what determines the proper 
mode of promulgation. This is an equally valid reading of the pro-
vision that gives each term meaning, so no compelling inference 
can be drawn in either direction. 
Even if one were to reject this explanation and take the ex-
pansive language as evidence that some properly designated 
statements of policy must be promulgated as regulations subject 
to notice and comment, the argument in favor of the broader in-
terpretation of the scope provision is by no means dispositive. The 
presumption against superfluity is just that: a presumption. It is 
one of many competing concerns that plays a role in determining 
the best meaning of a statutory provision.127 Canons of statutory 
interpretation are tools that can help us understand how an ordi-
nary reader of English would understand the text, but a single 
canon cannot on its own dictate the meaning of a statute.128 And 
 
 125 See, for example, Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 US 1, 12 (2004). 
 126 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(2). 
 127 See United States v Atlantic Research Corp, 551 US 128, 137 (2007) (“[O]ur hesi-
tancy to construe statutes to render language superfluous does not require us to avoid 
surplusage at all costs.”). 
 128 For criticism of substantive canons of interpretation, see generally Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about 
2018] Not So Different after All 1535 
 
the evidence provided by the rest of the statute favors a narrow 
reading of the scope provision. 
3. The whole act suggests that interpretive rules are not 
“regulations” subject to notice and comment. 
Considering the context provided by the whole text of a stat-
ute can help a reader determine the ordinary meaning of a word 
or phrase within a given provision.129 The Supreme Court has held 
that “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is deter-
mined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well 
by] the specific context in which the language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”130 
In this case, the broader context of the statute indicates that 
“regulations” and “interpretive rules” are separate categories; 
this distinction also applies within the scope provision. Sec-
tion 1395hh(e)(1)—the “retroactivity provision”—states that, ab-
sent certain circumstances, “[a] substantive change in regula-
tions, manual instructions, interpretative rules, statements of 
policy, or guidelines of general applicability under this title shall 
not be applied (by extrapolation or otherwise) retroactively to 
items and services furnished before the effective date of the 
change.”131 The provision clearly contemplates “regulations” and 
“interpretative rules” as distinct categories. The term “regula-
tion” should be understood to have the same meaning in the rest 
of the statute, including the scope provision and the notice-and-
comment provision.132 And if “regulations” and “interpretive 
 
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395 (1950); William N. Eskridge Jr, Book 
Review, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum L Rev 531 (2013). 
 129 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes 
and the Constitution 86 (Foundation 2016), citing United Savings Association of Texas v 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associate, Ltd, 484 US 365, 371 (1988) (“Statutory construction 
[ ] is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clari-
fied by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible 
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”); Scalia 
and Garner, Reading Law at 167–69, 180–82 (cited in note 89). 
 130 Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (alterations in original), 
quoting Robinson v Shell Oil Co, 519 US 337, 341 (1997) (quotation marks omitted). See 
also Eskridge, Interpreting Law at 87 (cited in note 129) (“Especially where the ordinary 
meaning of the statutory provision on point is open to more than one interpretation, the 
whole act can help us understand what the ordinary meaning of a statutory provision 
might be.”). 
 131 42 USC § 1395hh(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
 132 See Eskridge, Interpreting Law at 108 (cited in note 129) (“In our legal system, inter-
preters traditionally assume that ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are 
intended to have the same meaning.’”), quoting Sullivan v Stroop, 496 US 478, 484 (1990). 
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rules” are separate categories, then interpretive rules are not sub-
ject to the notice-and-comment requirement. This provision pro-
vides compelling evidence in favor of a narrow construction of the 
scope provision that excludes interpretive rules. 
One could also look to the alternative publication provision 
as a source of meaning, but this provision is, unfortunately, of 
limited probative value. The inclusion of a provision prescribing 
an alternative mode of publication means that HHS must be able 
to promulgate interpretive rules outside the province of 
§ 1395hh(a). But this still leaves the question of which interpre-
tive rules fall outside the scope of § 1395hh(a). 
Section 1395hh(a)(1)(3)(A) clearly contemplates that regula-
tions “prescribed” under § 1395hh(a)(1) will be published.133 So 
the alternative publication provision—which requires the publi-
cation of interpretive rules in the Federal Register—would be re-
dundant if interpretive rules were completely covered by the “reg-
ulations” subject to promulgation through notice and comment. 
The alternative publication provision could be read, then, to apply 
to all interpretive rules. The provision is, however, also consistent 
with only some interpretive rules being subject to publication un-
der the promulgation-power provision. In the latter reading, the 
provision would provide an alternative mode of publication only for 
those interpretive rules that are not covered by the scope provision. 
Neither interpretation is superior, so this provision provides no 
help in determining the scope of the notice-and-comment provision. 
4. The title of the scope provision strongly suggests that 
only legislative rules are “regulations” subject to the 
notice-and-comment requirement. 
The title of § 1395hh(a)—“Authority to prescribe regulations; 
ineffectiveness of substantive rules not promulgated by regula-
tion”134—provides further evidence that the scope provision ap-
plies specifically to legislative rules. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that “the title of a statute or section can aid in 
resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text.”135 The meaning 
 
 133 “The Secretary . . . shall establish and publish a regular timeline for the publica-
tion of final regulations.” 42 USC § 1395hh(a)(1)(3)(A). 
 134 42 USC § 1395hh(a) (emphasis added). 
 135 Immigration and Naturalization Service v National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, 
Inc, 502 US 183, 189 (1991), citing Mead Corp v Tilley, 490 US 714, 723 (1989); Federal 
Trade Commission v Mandel Brothers, Inc, 359 US 385, 388–89 (1959). See also Yates, 135 
S Ct at 1083 (looking to the title of a statute to interpret a statutory term). In Yates, each 
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of the scope provision is ambiguous, so consideration of the provi-
sion’s title is clearly appropriate. 
In general, legal terms of art bear their widely understood 
meaning absent compelling evidence to the contrary.136 So the 
term “substantive rules” ought to have the same meaning in the 
title of § 1395hh(a) as it does in other administrative law contexts. 
“Substantive rules” should be synonymous with the APA’s legis-
lative rules, which are, in contrast to interpretive rules, subject 
to notice and comment. And because the term “substantive rules” 
is used in the title in the same way that the phrase “rule[ ] . . . 
that establishes or changes a substantive legal standard” is used 
in the text of § 1395hh(a)(2), the two should be equated. This is 
particularly true given that “substantive rules” could easily be de-
fined as rules that “establish[ ] or change a substantive legal 
standard.”137 This is simply one piece of evidence supporting a 
narrower interpretation of the statute. But it seems more likely 
that Congress used superfluous language138 than that it implicitly 
gave a term with a widely understood meaning in the context of 
administrative law an entirely new meaning. 
  
 
opinion included some endorsement of the use of titles in statutory interpretation, but the 
dissent criticized the plurality by arguing that titles can often be underinclusive. See id at 
1094 (Kagan dissenting), citing Lawson v FMR LLC, 134 S Ct 1158, 1169 (2014). Courts, 
therefore, should be careful when using titles in statutory interpretation to avoid narrow-
ing the law simply because a title is necessarily abridged. Yates, 135 S Ct at 1094 (Kagan 
dissenting). There is no such risk in the interpretation of § 1395hh(a)(2) because the title 
uses a specific term of art that clarifies the meaning of a single ambiguous phrase within 
the text of the statute. 
 136 See Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 263 (1952): 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tra-
dition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the 
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning 
from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind 
unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be 
taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from 
them. 
While the meaning of “substantive rule” has not been established by “centuries of prac-
tice,” the term has been used widely in administrative law for most of the existence of the 
modern administrative state. 
 137 See Part III.B.1. 
 138 See notes 125–38 and accompanying text. 
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5. Legislative history suggests that the language of the 
scope provision was chosen to reflect the distinction 
between legislative and interpretive rules. 
Legislative history also suggests that the scope provision draws 
a distinction between legislative rules and interpretive rules, con-
firming that only the former are subject to notice and comment. The 
conference committee report for the amendment noted that “[t]he 
conference agreement includes the House Provision, with an 
amendment to clarify that only policies establishing or changing a 
substantive legal standard governing benefits, payment, or eligibil-
ity must be promulgated as regulations.” The conferees note that 
this language reflects recent court rulings.”139 
The “House Provision” to which the conference committee re-
fers would have implemented a “significant effect” test.140 
Congress deliberately opted to change the language from “signif-
icant effect” to “substantive legal standard.” The significant im-
pact (or substantial impact) test was widely used before the rise 
of the “legal effects” test to determine whether a rule was sub-
stantive: if a rule had a substantial impact, it was found to be 
substantive rather than interpretive.141 During the mid-1980s, 
around the time that the relevant amendment to the Medicare 
Act was passed, courts began abandoning the “substantial im-
pact” test and instead started asking whether the rule carried the 
force of law or was legally binding.142 In General Motors Corp v 
Ruckelshaus,143 for example, the DC Circuit held that “if by its 
action [an] agency intends to create new law, rights or duties, the 
rule is properly considered to be a legislative rule.”144 The fact that 
Congress initially included language associated with the substan-
tive/interpretive rule distinction and then changed the language 
to “reflect[ ] recent court rulings”145 suggests that Congress used 
the term “substantive legal standard” in a narrower sense that 
encompasses only legislative rules. A “rule . . . that establishes or 
changes a substantive legal standard” is simply a rule with legal 
effects. In other words, such a rule is a legislative rule. 
 
 139 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, HR Rep No 100-495, 100th Cong, 1st 
Sess 566 (1987), reprinted in 1987 USCCAN 2313-1245, 2313-1312 (emphasis added). 
 140 Id at 563. 
 141 See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 Admin L Rev 1321, 
1326 (2001). 
 142 See id. 
 143 742 F2d 1561 (DC Cir 1984). 
 144 Id at 1565. 
 145 HR Rep No 100-495 at 566 (cited in note 139). 
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On a related note, one could ask why Congress would have 
adopted language in the Medicare Act that differs so significantly 
from that of the APA if it did not intend to create a significantly 
different regime. In other words, the difference in statutory lan-
guage could indicate that Congress intended the statute to sub-
stantively differ. But there is an alternative explanation for the 
divergence. The Medicare Act’s rulemaking section was amended 
repeatedly, and piecemeal construction could naturally lead to a 
unique structure.146 It initially consisted solely of an authoriza-
tion to promulgate “regulations.” Starting from and building upon 
this unique place, the two major amendments to the statute im-
plemented and defined the scope of the notice-and-comment re-
quirement.147 The notice-and-comment provision was added first, 
and the scope provision seems to have been added to clarify it.148 
It makes sense that the scope provision, inserted to clarify exist-
ing law, would look different from the functionally equivalent por-
tion of the APA, which was part of the statutory scheme from the 
beginning. 
* * * 
The text of the scope provision strongly suggests that inter-
pretive rules are not “regulations” subject to notice and comment. 
While the key phrase “substantive legal standard” is somewhat 
ambiguous in isolation, the whole act, title of the key provision, 
and legislative history all support the conclusion that “regulations” 
and “interpretive rules” are separate categories within the 
Medicare Act. The latter need not go through notice and comment. 
C. Implications of the Narrow Meaning of “Regulations”: 
Rebutting the DC Circuit’s Expressio Unius Argument 
Under the narrow reading of the statute advocated by this 
Comment, interpretive rules are entirely outside the scope of the 
notice-and-comment provision because they are not “regulations” 
as defined in the scope provision. This interpretation of the stat-
ute rebuts the DC Circuit’s expressio unius argument. If the 
notice-and-comment provision applies only to regulations—that 
 
 146 See Part I.D.2. 
 147 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9321, 100 Stat at 2016; Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 4035, 101 Stat at 1330–77. 
 148 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 § 9321, 100 Stat at 2016; Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 § 4035, 101 Stat at 1330–77. 
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is, to the legislative rules identified in the scope provision—then 
it was entirely unnecessary for Congress to provide a separate ex-
ception to the rule. Providing an explicit good cause exception is 
necessary because that exception can apply to legislative rules. The 
DC Circuit’s application of expressio unius was inapposite because 
interpretive rules are entirely outside the scope of the requirement. 
The Medicare Act and the APA get to the same point regard-
ing interpretive rules but do so in different ways. Whereas the 
APA has a broad notice-and-comment requirement that it re-
stricts by way of an exception for interpretive rules, the Medicare 
Act has a narrower notice-and-comment requirement that ex-
cludes interpretive rules by definition. 
D. The Importance of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking 
All of the justifications for exempting interpretive rules from 
notice and comment in administrative law apply with equal force 
to the Medicare Act. Continued use of interpretive rulemaking 
can help address the ossification problem if used in cases in which 
the value of public participation is not particularly great. This 
may be what courts are implicitly doing when they apply the legal 
effects test. If one accepts the position that the legislative/inter-
pretive line is not a clear line between discrete categories, but ra-
ther a judgment about how much policymaking discretion we 
want to give agencies before restricting their autonomy, the dis-
tinction is made simply to balance the competing interests of ad-
ministrative efficiency and public participation. Reforming the 
notice-and-comment process might be the best solution to the 
problem of ossification, but it is likely that exempting interpretive 
rulemaking from notice and comment leads to more efficient rule-
making while imposing only limited burdens on the public. 
There are two significant benefits of the interpretive rule ex-
ception. First, interpretive rules are valuable because they allow 
agencies to quickly notify the public of how the agency interprets 
existing law.149 Interpretive rules are, in other words, an effective 
means of clarifying ambiguities and uncertainties in the law. If 
interpretive rules were required to go through notice and com-
ment, such uncertainty would increase. Second, notice and com-
ment imposes extra costs on agencies. Exempting interpretive 
rules from notice and comment allows agencies to spend their 
 
 149 See Franklin, 120 Yale L J at 303 (cited in note 5). 
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scarce resources in more productive ways.150 Such costs might be 
justified if notice and comment conferred significant social bene-
fits, but it seems unlikely to do so in the context of interpretive 
rules. 
The justifications for notice and comment lack some of their 
salience in the context of interpretive rules. Notice and comment 
is valuable in large part because it encourages public participa-
tion in rulemaking such that parties who may be affected by new 
regulations have a voice in the crafting of policy.151 This is partic-
ularly valuable because such parties likely have information at 
their disposal that is unavailable to the agency. If a proposed rule 
may come at a greater cost than anticipated, it would be valuable 
for the agency to have access to information that would allow it to 
more accurately gauge the costs of the rule and update its cost-
benefit analysis. 
But while interpretive rules certainly reflect policy decisions 
to some extent, they are first and foremost authoritative agency 
interpretations of existing law. In Allina Health Services, for ex-
ample, HHS simply decided that Medicare Part C recipients were 
also “entitled to benefits under Part A” for purposes of calculating 
hospitals’ reimbursement for Medicare enrollees.152 Such matters 
of interpretation are less likely to benefit from notice and com-
ment. The job of the HHS in such a case is simply to determine 
what “entitled to” means in the context of the Medicare Act.153 If 
the agency is acting as a faithful agent of Congress, trying to in-
terpret the statute to carry out the law, the notice-and-comment 
process would likely be of limited value in arriving at the correct 
interpretive outcome. 
One would expect lawyers working within federal agencies to 
be more expert in statutory interpretation than potential com-
mentators. Agency lawyers responsible for drafting rules will 
have expert knowledge of the authorizing statute and the rele-
vant background law. Interpretive input from, for example, regu-
lated parties will at best be redundant. In legislative rulemaking, 
outside parties will have key information at their disposal that is 
not available to the agency. But in interpretive rulemaking, there 
 
 150 See id at 304 (collecting sources). 
 151 See id at 305. 
 152 Allina Health Services, 863 F3d at 939 (quotation marks omitted). 
 153 It might seem strange to draw such a clear line between determining underlying 
meaning—which certainly requires some discretion—and creating law. But interpretation 
is generally understood within administrative procedure to not create substantive law. 
This understanding should apply with equal force in the context of Medicare. 
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is no information asymmetry that would make outside input help-
ful. Moreover, that input would almost certainly be dictated by 
the underlying financial interests of regulated parties. This is 
also true of legislative rulemaking, of course. But in interpretive 
rulemaking, there are no benefits that might justify the require-
ment that agencies consider obviously self-serving input. 
This does not mean, however, that the agency is unchecked. 
If the interpretive rule provides an unreasonable interpretation 
of the statute or goes beyond the acceptable bounds of interpreta-
tion, the rule can be challenged in court and struck down. To some 
extent, this is a matter of institutional (or public) competency. For 
legislative rules, notice and comment provides a necessary oppor-
tunity for parties to bring relevant information to agencies. For 
interpretive rules, however, agencies and courts are experts in 
statutory interpretation, and they can be expected to get to the 
right outcome without having to respond to potentially thou-
sands of public comments. And there is no reason to think that 
this applies any less in the Medicare context then in the rest of 
administrative law. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1395hh presents a difficult puzzle of statutory inter-
pretation—it resembles a very familiar statute but differs in key 
ways: its scope is dictated by a term whose ordinary meaning in 
context is not entirely clear, and the statute as a whole contains 
a number of contradictory signals. Nevertheless, the text of the 
scope provision, the larger statutory context, and the relevant leg-
islative history are clear when read together: interpretive rules 
are not “regulations” subject to notice and comment. 
This interpretation of § 1395hh can resolve the circuit split 
created by the DC Circuit in Allina Health Services. It suggests 
that the Medicare Act did not reproduce the APA’s requirements 
as clearly as the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits found. 
But the DC Circuit misinterpreted the term “substantive legal 
standard” and unduly emphasized the statute’s express excep-
tions in arguing that interpretive rules are subject to the statute’s 
notice-and-comment requirement. A more thorough interpreta-
tion of the statute shows that interpretive rules are not “regula-
tions” subject to notice and comment under the Medicare Act. 
Furthermore, this interpretation of § 1395hh raises issues 
relevant to courts constructing the rulemaking provisions of stat-
utes that fall outside the scope of the APA and, more generally, to 
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anyone engaging in statutory interpretation. First, it suggests 
that courts should not be too quick to assume that procedures cre-
ated outside the context of the APA are identical to those of the 
APA. In drafting § 1395hh, Congress deviated significantly in sev-
eral respects from the procedural requirements set out in the 
APA; those differences should be respected, and courts should be 
careful before concluding that the requirements are equivalent. 
In this case, the scope of the Medicare Act’s notice-and-comment 
provision is fundamentally different from that of the APA in that 
it implicitly excludes interpretive rules. While this leaves the 
Medicare Act’s effects functionally equivalent to those of the APA, 
there may be other statutes in which this is not the case. 
Second, it illustrates a problematic application of the expres-
sio unius canon that might be widespread and that courts should 
be wary of when engaging in statutory interpretation. If the scope 
of a rule is not completely clear, courts should carefully examine 
the scope before invoking the expressio unius canon to reject an 
implicit exception. The case of § 1395hh illustrates that “implicit 
exceptions” might not be improperly categorized, but instead 
might fall fundamentally outside the scope of the rule. 
